——IMAD SHOUER

For most existentialists and phenomenologists Heidegger’s attempt to bring philosophical discourse home to Dasein as a being in the world is a breakthrough in the history of philosophy.

對大多數(shù)存在主義者和現(xiàn)象學(xué)家來說，海德格爾試圖將哲學(xué)話語帶回到作為世界中的存在的 Dasein，是哲學(xué)史上的一個突破。

This breakthrough takes place in his approach to metaphysics[1] and more so in his great work Being and Time.[2] In the former he states the problems which traditional metaphysics confronts in the attempt to understand man as a being in the world. In the latter he offers alternatives through which new explications and directions in interpreting man’s relationship to the world is possible.

這種突破發(fā)生在他對形而上學(xué)的研究方法中 [1]，更發(fā)生在他的偉大作品《存在與時間》中[2]。在前者中，他指出了傳統(tǒng)形而上學(xué)在試圖理解人作為世界中的存在時所面臨的問題。在后者中，他提供了一些替代方案，通過這些方案，在解釋人與世界的關(guān)系方面有可能出現(xiàn)新的解釋和方向。

The major setback of traditional metaphysics, according to Heidegger, is related to its orientation, and more basically to its fundamental directions through which it lends itself to an understanding of the problem of Being. Consequently, Heidegger concludes that meta? physics needs to be redirected, or rather twisted around. Thus instead of looking into general categories and methods which can offer universality and cohesion concerning man’s nature, we should direct our attention to man himself and examine his existentiality, namely the modes of his being as a being in the world.

海德格爾認為，傳統(tǒng)形而上學(xué)的主要挫折與它的方向有關(guān)，更主要的是與它的基本方向有關(guān)，通過這些方向它可以理解存在的問題。因此，海德格爾的結(jié)論是，元物理學(xué)需要被重新定向，或者說被扭曲。因此，我們不應(yīng)該去研究那些能夠提供關(guān)于人的本性的普遍性和凝聚力的一般范疇和方法，而應(yīng)該把我們的注意力引向人本身，研究他的存在性，即他作為世界中的一個存在的模式。

This program needs two fundamental requirements:i) a basic com? prehension of language in order to grasp whatever Dasein attempts to communicate about his own existentiality, and 2) an understanding of Dasein’s modes, in which he expresses and relates himself to the world. Thus instead of attempting to know man through the mirror of traditional metaphysics, we reflect upon man himself in order to de? scribe his ontological relations with the world. By qualifying man’s relation with the world to be ontological, Heidegger means that man as an entity is capable of questioning himself as an entity among other entities.[3]

這個方案需要兩個基本要求： 1）對語言的基本理解，以便掌握 Dasein 試圖傳達的關(guān)于他自己的存在性的任何東西，以及 2）對 Dasein 的模式的理解， 在這些模式中，他表達并將自己與世界聯(lián)系起來。因此，我們不是試圖通過傳統(tǒng)形而上學(xué)的鏡子來認識人，而是對人本身進行反思，以便描述他與世界的本體論關(guān)系。海德格爾將人與世界的關(guān)系限定為本體論的關(guān)系，意味著人作為一個實體，能夠?qū)⒆约鹤鳛槠渌麑嶓w中的一個實體進行質(zhì)疑[3] 。

This very questioning which Dasein brings forth against himself is the evidence of man’s ontological conditions, namely the condition which stretches man's existentiality to the borderline of his own existence, the existence of a being who puts forth his very being in question. The starting point, therefore, ought not to be the study of being qua being, in the Aristotelian sense, but rather the analysis of Dasein’s ontological relation with the world. This analysis should also be con? fined to temporality because any transcendental speculation which does not address itself to the existentiality of Dasein in time is "double talk" which not only hinders our understanding of Dasein, but throws him on the level of transcendental speculation, the discourse which Heidegger consistently avoids.

Dasein 對自己提出的這種質(zhì)疑是人的本體論條件的證據(jù)，即把人的存在性延伸到他自己的存在的邊界的條件，即一個對自己的存在提出質(zhì)疑的存在。因此，出發(fā)點不應(yīng)該是研究亞里士多德意義上的存在本身，而是分析 Dasein 與世界的本體論關(guān)系。這種分析也應(yīng)該與時間性相聯(lián)系，因為任何不涉及 Dasein 在時間中的存在性的超驗推測都是 "兩面派"，不僅妨礙我們對 Dasein 的理解，而且將他拋到超驗推測的層面上，這是海德格爾一貫避免的話語。

In this paper I am following Heidegger’s approach in analyzing Dasein's modes as a being in the world, and the phenomenon which 1 have chosen to pursue in my analysis is waiting.

在本文中，我遵循海德格爾的方法來分析 Dasein 作為世界中的存在的模式，而我在分析中選擇的現(xiàn)象是等待。

As we follow man in his everydayness we see him engaged constantly with the other in situations. This engagement makes man open to a multiplicity of conditions; one which is unavoidable is waiting. Man is confronted with the possibility of waiting for a rendezvous with a friend, for a loved one to come from a journey, for the war to end, for graduation, to get married, for history to reach its dialectical end, or even waiting for God.[4] This experience of waiting can be examined phenomenologically.

當(dāng)我們在日常工作中跟隨人類時，我們看到他不斷地在各種情況下與他人接觸。這種接觸使人向多種條件開放；其中不可避免的是等待。人面臨著這樣的可能性：等待與朋友的約會，等待愛人從旅途中歸來，等待戰(zhàn)爭結(jié)束，等待畢業(yè)，等待結(jié)婚，等待歷史達到其辯證的終點，甚至等待上帝。

The phenomenon of waiting is not experienced by consciousness on the individual level only, but also on the collective level. On the individual level waiting is experienced subjectively, whereas on the collective level it is experienced in a projected state, i.e., on the social, political, theological, and historical level. Undoubtedly these projected states are interrelated and it is even difficult to separate them, but this difficulty docs not make the distinction between the levels of consciousness incomprehensible.

等待的現(xiàn)象不僅在個人層面上被意識體驗到，而且在集體層面上也是如此。在個人層面上，等待是主觀體驗的，而在集體層面上，它是在預(yù)測狀態(tài)下體驗的，即在社會、政治、神學(xué)和歷史層面上。毫無疑問，這些投射狀態(tài)是相互關(guān)聯(lián)的，甚至很難將它們分開，但這種困難并不意味著意識層次之間的區(qū)別是不可理解的。

On the collective level, however, individual consciousness becomes objectified and a part of the general collective state; its confrontation with waiting is shared, either reflectively or unreflectively, with the collective group. On the individual level the experience of waiting is subjectively felt and inwardly grasped.

然而，在集體層面上，個人意識成為客觀存在，成為一般集體狀態(tài)的一部分；它與等待的對抗被反思或不反思地與集體群體分享。在個人層面上，等待的經(jīng)驗是主觀感受和內(nèi)在把握的。

In this paper due attention will be given to the collective level of waiting, but more emphasis will be focused on the individual level.

本文將對集體層面的等待給予適當(dāng)關(guān)注，但更多的重點將放在個人層面。

In the midst of waiting man experiences the emptiness of time, or as Professor Ludwig Landgrebe suggests, the elapse of time. Why is this so? Because in the midst of waiting consciousness freezes on the threshold between the past as it was, and the future as expectation, or in the sense of coming to be. The presence does not exist in waiting because consciousness is thrown ahead of its immediate project in the possibilities of coming to be, not in the being of itself.

在等待的過程中，人體驗到了時間的空虛，或者像路德維希-蘭德格雷布教授所說的那樣，是時間的流逝。為什么會這樣呢？因為在等待的過程中，意識被凍結(jié)在過去的門檻上，而未來則是期待，或者說是即將到來的意義。在等待中，存在并不存在，因為意識被拋到了它眼前的項目之前，即未來的可能性，而不是它本身的存在。

In waiting, consciousness experiences a sense of disengagement from its very presence, because while waiting for someone to come, after he has not come at the specified time, or for some happenings that are only possibilities, the here and now elapses into the projected future and the projected future becomes the annihilating, or the objectifying, factor of consciousness. In this case consciousness becomes an object for waiting and loses not only its schemes of temporality, but also its articulation of its own presence. Thus consciousness becomes absent toward itself in waiting. Of course, one can say that I can avoid being subjected to the intensity of waiting by doing something while waiting. But this doing something is nothing but the acknowledgment of the anxiety which waiting already produced in consciousness. What consciousness is actually doing is escaping from the grip of waiting, but to no avail.

在等待中，意識體驗到一種脫離自身存在的感覺，因為在等待某人到來的時候，在他沒有在指定的時間到來之后，或者在等待一些只是可能發(fā)生的事情的時候，此時此刻就會消失在預(yù)測的未來中，而預(yù)測的未來就會成為意識的湮滅因素，或者說是對象化因素。在這種情況下，意識成為等待的對象，不僅失去了它的時間性計劃，而且也失去了它對自身存在的表述。因此，意識在等待中變得對自己不存在。當(dāng)然，人們可以說，我可以通過在等待時做一些事情來避免受制于等待的強度。但這一行動不過是承認等待已經(jīng)在意識中產(chǎn)生的焦慮。意識實際上在做的是逃離等待的控制，但無濟于事。

Let us apply this interpretation of waiting to a particular case in which the individual consciousness is experiencing waiting, and then analyze it in a more general case in which waiting is experienced collectively.

讓我們把對等待的這種解釋應(yīng)用于個人意識正在經(jīng)歷等待的特殊情況，然后在等待被集體經(jīng)歷的更普遍的情況下進行分析。

Gary is waiting for Pat to call sometime between four and five o’clock. In order to escape the objectification of waiting, Gary convinces himself that he is really not waiting, but reading, and while reading Pat may call. But after we scrutinize Gary’s situation in his attempt to escape self-objectification in waiting we find that he did not succeed doing so for various reasons.

加里正在等待帕特在四點到五點之間的某個時間打電話過來。為了擺脫等待的對象化，加里說服自己，他其實不是在等待，而是在閱讀，而在閱讀的時候，帕特可能會打電話來。但是，當(dāng)我們仔細研究加里試圖在等待中擺脫自我客體化的情況后，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，由于各種原因，他并沒有成功地做到這一點。

i) Was Gary waiting for Pat and while waiting, reading, or 2) was he engaged in mundane affairs as reading or writing and at the same time expecting a call from Pat?

i) 加里是否在等待帕特，并在等待中閱讀，或者 2) 他是否在從事閱讀或?qū)懽鞯仁浪资聞?wù)，同時期待著帕特的電話？

It is important to note the goal toward which the intentional grasp of consciousness is directed:

重要的是要注意意識的有意把握所指向的目標(biāo)：

a) Is it directed toward waiting?

a) 它是針對等待的嗎？

b) Is it directed toward reading?

b) 它是針對閱讀的嗎？

c) Is it directed toward waiting while reading or toward reading

c) 它是針對閱讀時的等待， 還是針對閱讀時的等待？

while waiting?

在等待中？

In the case of a and b there is no difficulty, because there is no duality or overlapping intentions within consciousness. The direction of the intentional act is projected toward waiting or reading. In either case one cannot say that ‘I am not waiting while reading’ or ‘1 am only reading and not actually waiting’.

在 a 和 b 的情況下，沒有任何困難，因為在意識中不存在二元性或重疊的意圖。意圖行為的方向是投射到等待或閱讀。在任何一種情況下，都不能說 "我在閱讀時沒有等待 "或 "我只是在閱讀而不是在等待"。

In the case of c, the situation is problematic for the following reason. If we ask Gary whether he is experiencing an emptiness of time, a sense of anxiety, or some form of duality in the directions of the intentionality of his consciousness, Gary is faced with only two possible alternatives, cither affirming his conscious state in waiting, or denying it. If he chooses to affirm it, we will not have any issue. But,if he decides that it is perfectly reasonable to be doing what he is involved in doing without experiencing any sense of duality in the use of his time while waiting for Pat, then Gary's situation can be scrutinized further.

在 c 的情況下，這種情況是有問題的，原因如下。如果我們問加里，他是否正在經(jīng)歷時間的空虛、焦慮感，或者他的意識的意向性方向的某種形式的二元性，加里只面臨兩種可能的選擇，要么肯定他在等待中的意識狀態(tài)，要么否認它。如果他選擇肯定它，我們就不會有任何問題。但是，如果他決定，在等待帕特的過程中，做他所參與的事情是完全合理的，而在使用他的時間時沒有體驗到任何二元性的感覺，那么，加里的情況就可以被進一步審查了。

Suppose it is a warm afternoon (the sun is glittering over the thick air of Terre Haute) and I burst into Gary’s office asking him if he would like to go for a cold beer. Reflectively or unreflectively, he will probably say "It’s a great idea. 1 wish I could go with you, but you see Pat might call at any minute.” What this implies then is that Gary has already devoted a specific chunk of time for one event which is conditioned by waiting. Which means that any desires or intentions which might arise in that specific chunk of time have to be blocked or imperatively negated.

假設(shè)這是一個溫暖的下午（太陽在特雷霍特厚重的空氣中閃閃發(fā)光），我沖進加里的辦公室，問他是否愿意去喝杯冰啤酒。他可能會反思或不反思地說： "這是個好主意。我希望能和你一起去，但你看帕特可能隨時會打電話來。 "那么，這意味著加里已經(jīng)為一個事件投入了特定的大塊時間，這是以等待為條件的。這意味著任何可能在那塊特定時間內(nèi)產(chǎn)生的欲望或意圖都必須被阻止或被強制否定。

What this actually implies is that when one’s presence is conditioned or determined by someone’s absence, the presence is emptied from one’s own decision, for the mere fact that consciousness stands still in exercising its own freedom. Neutralizing one’s time with indecision is equal to turning one’s being into an objectified entity.

這實際上意味著，當(dāng)一個人的存在被某人的缺席所制約或決定時，這個存在就從一個人自己的決定中被抽空了，因為僅僅是意識在行使自己的自由時靜止了。用優(yōu)柔寡斷來中和一個人的時間，等于把一個人的存在變成了一個物化的實體。

In this case, we can conclude from Gary’s situation that while he tries to overcome the psycho-ontological burdens of waiting,he in turn is captured by time and ostensibly becomes objectified by it. He is objectified by time because his decisions are no longer his and whatever he chooses he is not choosing in good faith. In waiting, therefore, we arc trapped with self-objectification, and trying to escape the burdens of waiting while waiting is nothing more than trying to escape bad faith by trying to escape from ourselves.

在這種情況下，我們可以從加里的情況中得出結(jié)論，當(dāng)他試圖克服等待的心理本體負擔(dān)時，他反過來被時間俘虜，表面上成為時間的對象。他被時間物化是因為他的決定不再是他自己的，無論他選擇什么，他都不是真誠地選擇。因此，在等待中，我們陷入了自我客體化的困境，而在等待中試圖擺脫等待的負擔(dān)，無非是試圖通過逃避自己來逃避惡意。

Waiting, then, causes self-alienation, namely alienation from our possibilities in time. This is evident, not only in Gary’s case, but in any case in which we surrender our time to an objectified condition, such as personal, social, political, theological, or even historical. This alienation of the self from its possibilities takes place as a result of neutralizing the concrete presence and suspending possible self-actualization into a specified project which is not articulated in the presence but in the hope of becoming. Thus, the here and now elapses into possible becoming, and consciousness fades away from its presence in order to speculate about that which is becoming; consequently consciousness becomes paralyzed and incapacitated in grasping its awareness of the here and now, because it is concentrating intentionally, so to speak, upon that which is becoming. This is the death of time in conscious? ness, namely the emptiness of time from its concrete existentiality.

那么，等待導(dǎo)致了自我異化，即與我們在時間中的可能性的異化。這一點很明顯，不僅在加里的案例中，而且在任何我們把時間交給一個客觀條件的案例中，如個人、社會、政治、神學(xué)、甚至歷史。這種自我與其可能性的疏離是由于中和了具體的存在，并將可能的自我實現(xiàn)暫停在一個特定的項目中，這個項目不是在存在中闡述的，而是在希望成為的過程中闡述的。因此，此時此地就變成了可能的成為，意識從它的存在中淡出，以便推測那正在成為的東西；因此，意識在把握它對此時此地的意識方面變得麻痹和無能，因為它有意地集中在那正在成為的東西上，可以這么說。這就是時間在意識中的死亡，即時間從其具體存在性中的空虛。

As the characteristic of waiting turns out to be, in essence, equal to the characteristic of facticity, i.e., a borderline which limits the transcendence of consciousness, or an impasse which stands against possible self-actualization: the inescapable effect of waiting is self-negation.

由于等待的特征在本質(zhì)上等同于事實性的特征，即限制意識的超越的邊界，或者說是反對可能的自我實現(xiàn)的僵局：等待的不可避免的效果是自我否定。

The symptoms of self-negation arise in consciousness as soon as the anxiety of waiting overshadows its intentional horizon. Thus in order to escape its out-of-hand predicament, consciousness leaps out cunningly against itself in order to escape the barrier of the facticity of waiting.

一旦等待的焦慮籠罩了意識的意向性視野，自我否定的癥狀就會在意識中出現(xiàn)。因此，為了擺脫其失控的困境，意識狡猾地跳出來反對自己，以擺脫等待的事實性的障礙。

This cunning is evident among the mystics of most religious beliefs, especially the Christians, who develop a sense of unhappy conscious? ness in order to endure the apocalyptic span of waiting, or simply the waiting of the individual self for God.[5] But to the mystic, self-negation is not an escape from the anxiety of waiting in the negative sense, but a virtue, because it is a fundamental prerequisite in developing a sense of passivity to the worldly,in order to become worthy of the out-worldly. Waiting therefore becomes a challenging exercise for the soul in order to conquer time. By conquering time man as finite transcends temporality, and by transcending temporality, he makes headway for the infinite in him to become worthy of the eternal. Kierkegaard showed no mercy in abolishing this hope, considering it a sickness unto death. This sickness can neither be overcome nor cured.It is engraved in the very nature of man, and its solutions arc beyond man's reach.[6] In his attack upon Christendom he was not only attacking Christianity as an organized church, but also attacking the mystification of Christianity and the monopoly over God by the church. Mysticism is rejected by Kierkegaard on three grounds:1) the impossibility for man as finite to reach or rather to embrace the infinite in time, 2) the tendency of making private and subjective thinking publicly objectified, and 3) for making the ending of the religious struggle too optimistic and mundane.

這種狡猾在大多數(shù)宗教信仰的神秘主義者中是顯而易見的，尤其是基督徒，他們發(fā)展出一種不快樂的意識，以忍受世界末日般的等待，或者干脆說是個人自我對上帝的等待。 5 但對神秘主義者來說，自我否定并不是消極意義上對等待焦慮的逃避，而是一種美德，因為它是發(fā)展對世俗的被動感的基本前提，以便成為配享世俗的人。因此，等待成為靈魂的一項挑戰(zhàn)，以征服時間。通過征服時間，人作為有限的人超越了時間性，而通過超越時間性，他為他體內(nèi)的無限性取得了進展，從而成為永恒的價值?？藸杽P郭爾在廢除這種希望時毫不留情，認為它是一種致死的疾病。這種病既不能克服，也不能治愈。它是刻在人的本性中的，它的解決方法是人無法企及的。 [6] 在他對基督教的攻擊中，他不僅是在攻擊作為有組織的教會的基督教，也是在攻擊基督教的神秘化和教會對上帝的壟斷?？藸杽P郭爾拒絕神秘主義的理由有三： 1）人作為有限的人不可能在時間上達到或者說擁抱無限， 2）使私人和主觀的思維公開化的傾向， 3）使宗教斗爭的結(jié)局過于樂觀和世俗化。

What Kierkegaard suggests is that the mystic does not overcome waiting but simply ignores it, as he ignores time. When he discovers that its temporality alienates the finite from the infinite in man, he abolishes it altogether, pretending that all the elements of separation will vanish if time is abolished and this will inevitably guarantee headway toward total participation with the infinite. Our view is that this is not only illusory, but also that it dehumanizes man from his temporality m time, the only ground for consciousness to project its intentional transcendence.

克爾凱郭爾所建議的是，神秘主義者并沒有克服等待，而只是忽視它，就像他忽視時間一樣。當(dāng)他發(fā)現(xiàn)時間性使人的有限性與人的無限性疏遠時，他就完全廢除了時間，假裝如果廢除了時間，所有分離的因素都會消失，這將不可避免地保證走向與無限性的完全參與。我們的觀點是，這不僅是虛幻的，而且還使人脫離了他的時間性--時間，這是意識投射其有意超越的唯一基礎(chǔ)。

Kierkegaard was at least passionately and intellectually honest concerning man’s limitation in the way of transcending time. He not only ruled out the possibility of total vertical transcendence but he also considered it a paradox. Man cannot solve the predicament of this paradox, he can only surrender to it. And Christianity is precisely the paradox[7].

克爾凱郭爾對于人在超越時間方面的局限性至少是充滿激情和理智的。他不僅排除了完全垂直超越的可能性，而且還認為這是一個悖論。人無法解決這個悖論的困境，他只能向它投降。而基督教恰恰就是這個悖論[7]。

Our interpretation of Kierkegaard in this respect makes sense in regard to the phenomenon of waiting if we consider the mystery of revelation, eternal blessedness, or salvation as possibilities which can be revealed in temporality. If they are possibilities, then the devoted Christian mystics hope to witness their actualization in time. In the face of hoping, waiting for the mystery becomes the ritual of everydayness. Waiting for the mystery and hoping for its revelation intoxicate the mystic’s consciousness and become an obsession. It is here that waiting enters into the horizon of consciousness. The mystics attempt? ed to overcome waiting by deceiving themselves in their seduction of time, whereas Kierkegaard faced the dilemma, or rather the paradox, by radicalizing his passion in his involvement. All that man can do is to surrender to the paradox[8]; but by surrendering to the paradox the predicament is not solved. It is only a beginning, because the infinite struggle in the face of anguish and despair never ends. The more consciousness, the more anguish[9] This implies that the more we become conscious of our alienation from ourselves or from God, the more we attempt to overcome this alienation—but to no avail. In spite of this hopelessness, Kierkegaard invokes the totality of his being to face the paradox of his existential situation with conscious involvement and radical commitment, whereas the mystics exercise the rituals of self-negation in order to escape absurdity. A happy ending for the soul overshadows their conception of time. For this reason they view time from the illusory perspective of time—eternal, and not from the actual perspective of time—temporal. Waiting then is a virtue because the soul can demonstrate loving patience in preparing itself for the mystery.

我們對克爾凱郭爾在這方面的解釋在等待現(xiàn)象方面是有意義的，如果我們把啟示的奧秘、永恒的幸?；蚓融H視為可以在時間性中揭示的可能性。如果它們是可能性，那么虔誠的基督教神秘主義者就希望見證它們在時間上的實現(xiàn)。在希望面前，等待神秘成為日常的儀式。對神秘的等待和對其啟示的希望，使神秘主義者的意識沉醉其中，成為一種癡迷。正是在這里，等待進入了意識的地平線。神秘主義者試圖通過在時間的誘惑中欺騙自己來克服等待，而克爾凱郭爾則通過在參與中激化他的激情來面對這一困境，或者說是悖論。人所能做的就是向悖論投降[8]；但通過向悖論投降，困境并沒有得到解決。它只是一個開始，因為面對苦惱和絕望的無限掙扎永遠不會結(jié)束。意識越強，痛苦越多[9] 這意味著我們越是意識到我們與自己或上帝的疏離，我們就越是試圖克服這種疏離--但無濟于事。盡管有這種無望，克爾凱郭爾還是調(diào)用了他的全部生命，以有意識的參與和激進的承諾來面對他的生存狀況的悖論，而神秘主義者則行使自我否定的儀式，以逃避荒謬。靈魂的幸福結(jié)局籠罩著他們的時間概念。由于這個原因，他們從時間-永恒的虛幻角度看待時間，而不是從時間-時間的實際角度。因此，等待是一種美德，因為靈魂可以表現(xiàn)出愛的耐心， 為神秘的事情做準(zhǔn)備。

For Kierkegaard man is in time—temporal, but he has awareness for the eternal in him. This awareness does not solve the problem of man’s limitations in time. Kierkegaard suggests that all man can do is to internalize time in his inwardness and to immerse himself in the presence with that which represents his absolute concern. Overcoming waiting is therefore problematic, in spite of this radicalization.

對克爾凱郭爾來說，人是在時間--時間性的，但他對他身上的永恒有意識。這種意識并不能解決人在時間上的限制問題?？藸杽P郭爾認為，人所能做的就是將時間內(nèi)化于他的內(nèi)在性，并將自己沉浸在與代表他絕對關(guān)注的事物的存在之中。因此，克服等待是有問題的，盡管有這種激進化。

This is the reason behind Kierkegaard's decision to direct his passion to only one concern, to either God or . .,[10] not both. Any compromise m concern is a betrayal of both: any solidification of passion is an act of bad faith. The least we can say about Kierkegaard is that he was not hypocritical.

這就是克爾凱郭爾決定將他的激情只用于一個關(guān)注點的背后原因，要么是上帝，要么是......而不是兩者。任何妥協(xié)的關(guān)注都是對兩者的背叛：任何激情的固化都是一種不真誠的行為。關(guān)于克爾凱郭爾，我們至少可以說，他并不虛偽。

From the Marxist point of view, self-negation is consciously structured in religion in order to dislocate consciousness from its concrete situation. The ruling class will have an open hand in controlling material resources when the masses are oriented toward the eternal and negating the temporal. The feudalism of the Middle Ages and the church are indivisible in power.[11]

從馬克思主義的觀點來看，自我否定在宗教中是有意識的結(jié)構(gòu)，以使意識與它的具體處境脫節(jié)。當(dāng)群眾面向永恒而否定暫時時，統(tǒng)治階級在控制物質(zhì)資源方面就會有一個開放的手。中世紀(jì)的封建主義和教會的力量是不可分割的。

The masses wait for spiritual sublimity and the class manipulates their energy for more gain. Consequently, when the masses are intoxicated with hope in waiting for salvation, the ruling class is at ease in exploiting them. The function of religion is therefore twofold: 1) to encourage patience in waiting for salvation, and 2) to alienate collective consciousness from becoming consciously aware of social, political, and economic injustice.

群眾等待精神上的升華，而階級則操縱他們的能量以獲取更多利益。因此，當(dāng)群眾在等待救贖的過程中沉醉于希望時，統(tǒng)治階級就可以放心地剝削他們。因此，宗教的功能是雙重的：一）鼓勵人們耐心等待救贖，二）疏遠集體意識，使其無法自覺意識到社會、政治和經(jīng)濟的不公正。

The historical process of dialectical materialism, according to Marx, will eventually synthesize the contradiction, and the working class will overcome alienation when it controls its production. But Marx's rejection of waiting and his dependence on time to digest contradictions made him a concrete existentialist. In the objectification of historical process, decisions and action can speed up, if not twist around, the historical situation. Revolution is necessary in order to get rid of the misery and suffering in waiting. Marx thus radicalized time by getting rid of historical objectivity and making time subjective, namely subject, to the collective act of consciousness in time, in order for people to grasp liberty with their own hands and to protect themselves from being exploited or objectified.

按照馬克思的說法，辯證唯物主義的歷史進程最終會合成矛盾，工人階級在控制了自己的生產(chǎn)后就會克服異化。但馬克思對等待的拒絕和對消化矛盾的時間的依賴，使他成為一個具體的存在主義者。在歷史進程的對象化中，決定和行動可以加速，甚至扭曲歷史形勢。為了擺脫等待中的悲慘和痛苦，革命是必要的。因此，馬克思通過擺脫歷史的客觀性，使時間成為主觀的，即受制于時間的集體意識行為，從而使人們用自己的雙手掌握自由，保護自己不被剝削或被物化，從而使時間變得激進。

Nietzsche's approach to the problem of self-negation in waiting takes a different course. Submission and humility are the result of negative morality which is emphasized in the Judeo-Christian tradition.[12]Herd morality for Nietzsche is not too different from the morality of the alienated masses in Marx. The way to overcome self-negation for Nietzsche is through the will to power. The will can break through time in order to replace the submissive and negative will with a positive one. The positive will rejects waiting for orders and initiates its own.It does not hesitate to become involved with life because it is already a positive part of it.It says yes and takes full responsibility for its engagements.It establishes its own morality as it manifests itself in action.It docs not wait for possibilities because it is already an actuality incarnated in the here and now.

尼采對等待中的自我否定問題采取了不同的處理方式。臣服和謙卑是猶太教-基督教傳統(tǒng)中強調(diào)的消極道德的結(jié)果。 [12]尼采的群居道德與馬克思的異化大眾的道德沒有太大區(qū)別。對尼采來說，克服自我否定的方法是通過權(quán)力意志。意志可以突破時間，以便用積極的意志取代順從和消極的意志。積極的意志拒絕等待命令，并啟動自己的意志。它毫不猶豫地參與到生活中去，因為它已經(jīng)是生活的一個積極部分。它說是的，并對它的參與承擔(dān)全部責(zé)任。

Nietzsche’s morality, which stands beyond traditional concepts of good and evil, cannot be viewed independently from will and time. It is through time that the will actualizes itself. And the conception of time entertained by the will can either be an arresting factor or a breakthrough. When time i$ viewed with the objective lens of the absolute and becomes absolutized, then the activities of the will, or consciousness in time, becomes meaningless. But when time is viewed from the subjective vision of man then human action can have meaning in time. Asceticism in Western Christianity as well as in Eastern Hinduism viewed time from the former perspective, whereas Nietzsche attempted to replace it with the latter.

尼采的道德超越了傳統(tǒng)的善與惡的概念，不能脫離意志和時間來看待。意志正是通過時間來實現(xiàn)自身。而意志所接受的時間概念既可以是一個阻礙因素，也可以是一個突破口。當(dāng)用絕對的客觀鏡頭來看待時間并使之絕對化時，那么意志的活動，或時間中的意識，就變得毫無意義。但是，當(dāng)時間從人的主觀視野來看時，那么人的行動在時間中就會有意義。西方基督教的禁欲主義以及東方的印度教都是從前者的角度來看待時間，而尼采則試圖用后者來取代它。

If we draw a line between objective time and waiting and subjective time and action we can see that the two categories are contraries. Revolutionizing time, therefore, is nothing more than twisting the two conceptions around; Nietzsche does precisely that.

如果我們在客觀的時間和等待與主觀的時間和行動之間畫一條線，我們可以看到這兩個類別是對立的。因此，對時間進行革命，無非是把這兩個概念扭曲一下；尼采正是這樣做的。

We suggest that in waiting the will becomes restless and conscious? ness disoriented if not hypnotized by its objectified state. Waiting en? forces consciousness to dislocate its intentional activities from its immediate concern and shatters its certainty to replace it with a state of confusion. In short, waiting poisons time with meaninglessness.

我們認為，在等待中，意志會變得不安，意識也會迷失方向，如果不是被它的對象化狀態(tài)所催眠。等待迫使意識把它的意向性活動與它的直接關(guān)切脫節(jié)，并粉碎了它的確定性，以一種混亂的狀態(tài)取代它。簡而言之，等待以無意義的方式毒害了時間。

Conclusion: The phenomenon of waiting is an existential reality.It carries within it an element of facticity to the extent that it deteriorates the structure of the presence and throws consciousness into a state of annihilation. Thus in waiting, consciousness experiences a sense of objectification and loses its subjectivity.

結(jié)論：等待的現(xiàn)象是一種存在的現(xiàn)實。它帶有事實性的因素，以至于它惡化了存在的結(jié)構(gòu)，并將意識拋入一種湮滅的狀態(tài)。因此，在等待中，意識經(jīng)歷了一種對象化的感覺，并失去了其主觀性。

In waiting, time becomes distorted, and with this distortion consciousness negates its concrete relations and orientation to the world. This fact causes anxiety and self-objectification, and as a result consciousness becomes trapped in time as becoming and negates the here and now. Hence, the now becomes emptied from conscious and reflective engagement. For this reason we claim that in waiting, consciousness experiences the death of time in a sense that time elapses indefinitely into possibilities of becoming and evasiveness from the present. Waiting can only be overcome through the radicalization of time by radicalizing one's choice in any given situation of waiting, or by not allowing consciousness to become conscious of itself in time. In the former, time becomes a transcendental field articulated through the intentional project of consciousness; in the latter time becomes a hypnotic factor for consciousness in which it remains in deep slumber, unconscious of time and therefore unaware of waiting.

在等待中，時間變得扭曲，而隨著這種扭曲，意識否定了它與世界的具體關(guān)系和方向。這一事實導(dǎo)致了焦慮和自我對象化，結(jié)果是意識陷入了時間的成為之中，否定了此時此地。因此， "現(xiàn)在 "從意識和反思的參與中被抽空。出于這個原因，我們聲稱，在等待中，意識經(jīng)歷了時間的死亡，在這個意義上，時間無限期地流逝，變成了成為和逃避現(xiàn)在的可能性。等待只能通過時間的激進化來克服，即在任何特定的等待情境中激進化自己的選擇，或者不允許意識在時間中變得有意識。在前者中，時間成為一個通過意識的意向性項目闡明的超驗領(lǐng)域；在后者中，時間成為意識的一個催眠因素，在其中，它仍然處于深深的沉睡之中，對時間沒有意識，因此對等待沒有意識。

1- M. Heidegger. Essays m Metaphysics. Philosophical Library. Inc.. New York. i960 (see also Being and Time. p. 6g).

2- M. Heidegger. Being and Time (Harper and Row: New York), 1962.?

3- Ibid., 60. 78, 9; (although this notion of the being of Dasein is theoretic in Begin and Time).

4-Simone Weill. Waiting on God, trans, by Emma Craufurd, Routledge, Lon? don. (9；a.

5- Ibid

6- S. Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death (Doubleday and Company: Garden City. 1954), PP.147,148-50, 153, 163.

7- Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1963), p. 95.

8- Ibid., p. 95. ??

9- Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, p. 153-57. 162.

10- Kierkegaard, Either/Or (Doubleday and Company, Inc: Carden City, ?959)-

11- Kail Man. The? Communist Manifesto (Appleton, Century, Crofts: New York, 1055).

12- Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Moral? (Vintage Press: New York, 1966). (See also. Beyond Good and Evil.)