“憲法第十四修正案的平等原則將會(huì)為我們這個(gè)社會(huì)中最貧窮、最卑微、最被鄙視的族群和社會(huì)上最富有、最有影響力、最傲慢的群體提供同樣的權(quán)利和法律的保障。如果做不到這條公平的原則, 那么所謂的共和政府就沒(méi)有存在的必要。” Jacob?Howard 密歇根州參議員 作者?|?呂劼 部分配圖來(lái)源網(wǎng)絡(luò)

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平權(quán)法案 Affimative Action?與憲法第十四修正案平等原則?Equal Protection Clause

關(guān)于平權(quán)法案相信最近關(guān)注美國(guó)新聞的朋友們大概有所了解了。它最初的目的是一方面促進(jìn)在高等教育、就業(yè)市場(chǎng)當(dāng)中的種族、民族、文化的多元性, 另一方面由于歷史原因美國(guó)境內(nèi)的多個(gè)少數(shù)族裔曾經(jīng)或多或少的收到過(guò)歧視或者不公正地對(duì)待, 而通過(guò)平權(quán)法案, 推動(dòng)者們希望能夠通過(guò)給予這些少數(shù)族裔更多的特殊的優(yōu)待政策來(lái)彌補(bǔ)他們?cè)?jīng)在歷史上收到過(guò)的不公正的待遇。因?yàn)槠綑?quán)法案的實(shí)質(zhì)就是用一種歧視來(lái)替代掉另外一種歧視, 例如在大學(xué)招生的過(guò)程中種族和膚色成為了能夠被錄取的關(guān)鍵因素, 相反學(xué)術(shù)能力、工作經(jīng)驗(yàn)、社會(huì)經(jīng)驗(yàn)等方面卻不那么重要。此前在民間和立法機(jī)構(gòu)中已經(jīng)有許多呼聲希望廢除平權(quán)法案。最高法院終于在今天, 6月29日在哈佛大學(xué)招生歧視一案中以平權(quán)法案違反憲法第十四修正案中平等原則將平權(quán)法案廢除。此后種族和民族這些因素將不能夠被作為大學(xué)錄取的參考因素。

而平等原則是憲法第十四修正案中最核心的條款。原文說(shuō)的是任何一個(gè)州政府不能剝奪任何一個(gè)個(gè)人其他人所擁有的法律權(quán)利的保障。對(duì)于修正案的推動(dòng)者來(lái)說(shuō), 平等原則是憲政體制下最為核心的一條基本準(zhǔn)則“全體美國(guó)的公民在法律面前人人平等?！?因此憲法不能夠允許任何由于膚色和族群原因而帶來(lái)的歧視, 另外能夠適用于一個(gè)個(gè)人的法律也必須要能夠適用于除了這個(gè)人之外的其他任何人。

今天我正好不用工作, 看完了最高法院的決策意見(jiàn), 有感而發(fā)表達(dá)一下我個(gè)人的看法。

雖然第十四修正案是內(nèi)戰(zhàn)之后就通過(guò)參眾兩院的決議生效并成為法案的, 但在將近半個(gè)世紀(jì)的時(shí)間里, 美國(guó)有許多州依然以各種理由堅(jiān)持著原有的種族歧視政策, 例如在教育領(lǐng)域的種族隔離、黑人和其他少數(shù)族裔在相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)的時(shí)間里不能夠和白人共同用餐、各種娛樂(lè)場(chǎng)所、商業(yè)公司招聘員工、政府公職人員的錄取等等諸多方面都存在過(guò)赤裸裸的歧視行為。甚至二戰(zhàn)后在戰(zhàn)場(chǎng)上為美國(guó)流血犧牲的黑人戰(zhàn)士們回國(guó)之后由于種族膚色, 都不能夠享有和他們俘虜?shù)募{粹戰(zhàn)俘同樣的待遇。但是從上世紀(jì)六十年代開(kāi)始, 在如馬丁路德金等一系列民權(quán)運(yùn)動(dòng)的推動(dòng)下, 美國(guó)最高法院逐漸開(kāi)始以違反第十四修正案平等原則, 強(qiáng)制性廢除了在公共領(lǐng)域和民間普遍存在的各類種族歧視政策。?

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不論以哪種形式的種族歧視都是錯(cuò)的

聊了歷史, 我來(lái)談?wù)勎覀€(gè)人的看法:?種族歧視行為或者政策不管以哪種形式、哪種方向、誰(shuí)是收益人都是錯(cuò)的。

憲法十四修正案平等原則背后真正的核心理念在我看來(lái)是我華夏族人可能最熟悉不過(guò)的一句話了, 那就是“己所不欲、勿施于人”: 試問(wèn)決策的制定者們自己愿意由于他們根本無(wú)法控制的因素而受到他人的歧視對(duì)待么? 很顯然是不愿意的。既然不愿意又為什么用他們自己不愿意接受的痛苦去施加到別人的身上呢? 從前的種族歧視是由于你是黑人、拉丁裔、或者亞洲人收到種族歧視。而現(xiàn)在除了亞裔之外, 倒是反過(guò)來(lái)了:?白人、猶太人、亞洲人受到種族歧視和不公平的對(duì)待。我生在哪里、是什么族屬、什么膚色, 這些東西不是我能夠控制的, 而如果僅僅是因?yàn)檫@些我壓根控制不了的因素導(dǎo)致我在申請(qǐng)學(xué)校、就業(yè)、等方面無(wú)法享有其他族裔所享有的機(jī)會(huì), 這很顯然是不公平的。?

哈佛自己也承認(rèn)高等教育的目的是為了選取最為優(yōu)秀、最為有潛力的青年人, 給他們機(jī)會(huì)將他們培養(yǎng)成為未來(lái)美國(guó)社會(huì)各個(gè)領(lǐng)域中的領(lǐng)袖和精英;?同時(shí)哈佛在上訴過(guò)程中給出之所以采用種族、民族的因素作為錄取的考量是為了促進(jìn)文化多元、使得不同的思想、理念在校園里能夠自由表達(dá)互相交流; 再有就是降低民間對(duì)部分少數(shù)族裔的固有的負(fù)面印象, 彌補(bǔ)這些少數(shù)族裔在歷史上說(shuō)收到過(guò)的不公正對(duì)待。

在我看來(lái), 另外最高法院意見(jiàn)書(shū)中也明確指出了, 通過(guò)將種族、民族、膚色等淺層面的因素納入招生的考量因素中的招生政策, 不論從事實(shí)上還是邏輯上不僅不能夠達(dá)成以上三個(gè)目標(biāo)中的任何一個(gè), 還會(huì)帶來(lái)極其惡劣的邏輯后果。?

首先由于種族、膚色這些因素就被錄取了, 因?yàn)槊總€(gè)學(xué)校招生名額有限, 招生的實(shí)質(zhì)就是一場(chǎng)零和博弈, 那就意味著有更優(yōu)秀、更具有潛力、學(xué)術(shù)和工作能力更強(qiáng)的候選人因?yàn)榉N族、膚色這些原因被哈佛給拒掉了。既然這樣那哈佛怎么能夠做到將“最有潛力的青年培養(yǎng)成為未來(lái)美國(guó)各界的領(lǐng)袖”這一目標(biāo)呢?

另外民族、種族這些概念本就沒(méi)有明確定義, 將沒(méi)有明確定義的概念使用于具體的個(gè)案這個(gè)事情本身就是很離譜的一件事。比如說(shuō)那什么是亞洲人? 東亞諸國(guó)出生的人膚色較淺, 而南亞和東南亞的人膚色較深, 面對(duì)這種情況該如何區(qū)分? 不同族裔互相通婚之后的后代身上會(huì)有多個(gè)族裔的印記, 面對(duì)這種情況又該如何區(qū)分? 華夏族、猶太人, 這些概念從來(lái)就是文明的概念, 跟血緣和族屬壓根就沒(méi)有關(guān)系, 那面對(duì)一個(gè)跟大多數(shù)人不同膚色的華夏族或者猶太人, 又該如何區(qū)分?

再有將思想多元、文化多元這些理念與民族和種族混在一起這是一種錯(cuò)的離譜且會(huì)導(dǎo)致嚴(yán)重邏輯后果的思維誤區(qū)。?哈佛的原話是說(shuō):?不同的膚色和族裔經(jīng)常會(huì)帶來(lái)不同的理念和思想。那言下之意就是說(shuō)只要是同一族屬就必然會(huì)擁有同樣的思想、理念和價(jià)值觀, 而不同膚色和族裔在思想、理念、和價(jià)值觀方面就必然不同??稍微有點(diǎn)腦子的人就應(yīng)該能判斷出這條理由根本就不符合邏輯, 更與事實(shí)相悖。如果真的同一個(gè)族裔、同一個(gè)膚色、同一個(gè)民族就必須只能有一種思想、一種價(jià)值觀、一種理念, 那這太可怕了吧, 這還是人么? 恐怕就是在動(dòng)物世界里, 他們的腦子也不會(huì)如此的整齊劃一吧。除非在哈佛招生官的眼里, 他們招的不是人而是一個(gè)一個(gè)通過(guò)模子扣出來(lái)的泥像, 或者一臺(tái)臺(tái)在工廠里統(tǒng)一定做的機(jī)器。?

再說(shuō)到哈佛給出的第三個(gè)理由, 即通過(guò)平權(quán)法案來(lái)彌補(bǔ)少數(shù)族裔歷史上受過(guò)的不公正對(duì)待。?最高法院很精確的指出了一個(gè)問(wèn)題, 那就是這種補(bǔ)救措施要施行到什么時(shí)候呢? 人類歷史發(fā)展至今已經(jīng)有幾萬(wàn)年了, 不論任何民族、任何地區(qū), 大家的發(fā)展都是從無(wú)知到擁有知識(shí)、從野蠻到文明、從不講道理到明白事理, 如果一個(gè)游戲規(guī)則的設(shè)置使得后來(lái)已經(jīng)文明、懂道理、有知識(shí)并且對(duì)祖先們犯過(guò)的錯(cuò)誤有深刻認(rèn)識(shí)的后人要為先祖?zhèn)冊(cè)跉v史上犯過(guò)的錯(cuò)不停地付出代價(jià), 那么請(qǐng)問(wèn)在沒(méi)有開(kāi)化之前誰(shuí)的祖上沒(méi)有過(guò)野蠻的行徑? 堅(jiān)持這樣觀點(diǎn)的人們難道認(rèn)為人類社會(huì)是永遠(yuǎn)不會(huì)向前推進(jìn)的么??

最后結(jié)合我自身的體會(huì)談一下哈佛所提出的對(duì)于消除少數(shù)族裔固有負(fù)面影響的看法：這種“以膚色論英雄的做法”與其初衷完全背道而馳, 這類行為相反只會(huì)加深人們對(duì)于這類少數(shù)族裔的固有負(fù)面印象:?

法學(xué)院第二學(xué)期作為法律博士一年級(jí)必修課程, 我們所有人都必須修地產(chǎn)法。而教我們的黑人女教授就畢業(yè)于哈佛法學(xué)院, 整個(gè)學(xué)期下來(lái), 從教學(xué)的質(zhì)量、數(shù)量、教授的學(xué)術(shù)能力、整體水平、課堂氣氛、互動(dòng)效果等各個(gè)方面這位教授跟其他的大教授們根本不在一個(gè)量級(jí)上。作為律考必考課程, 也是一年級(jí)的必修主課, 面對(duì)這個(gè)情況同學(xué)們可以說(shuō)是怨聲載道, 甚至有些美國(guó)同學(xué)直接把這個(gè)情況捅到了法學(xué)院院長(zhǎng)那了。

初來(lái)乍到, 我作為外國(guó)人沒(méi)必要惹不必要的麻煩,?另外老師其實(shí)對(duì)我不錯(cuò), 但這個(gè)學(xué)期過(guò)后我自己不由得會(huì)有幾個(gè)疑問(wèn):?哈佛法學(xué)院到底把“以膚色論英雄”這事做到了什么地步??以后在工作環(huán)境中我如果遇到一個(gè)情況需要用一位哈佛法學(xué)院的黑人律師, 那我是否應(yīng)該先質(zhì)疑他(她)的個(gè)人能力和素養(yǎng)? 如果我不額外的做考察就用了這個(gè)人, 那我是不是會(huì)因?yàn)橛昧艘粋€(gè)能力素養(yǎng)不夠的人而將信任我的人置于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)之中?

所以說(shuō)到底, 這不是我在歧視黑人, 是哈佛法學(xué)院在歧視黑人, 因?yàn)檎撬麄兊倪@種招生原則逼的我們?cè)趯?shí)際工作中為了保護(hù)自身利益不得不多一分考量。???

最后借用馬丁路德金博士的一句名言, 也是我上大學(xué)時(shí)最喜歡的一篇演講之一:“我有一個(gè)夢(mèng)想, 有一天我的孩子們可以生活在一個(gè)不以膚色被人評(píng)價(jià)、而以他們的內(nèi)在品質(zhì)而去被別人評(píng)價(jià)的社會(huì)?！?/p>

盼好

6月29日

寫(xiě)于堪薩斯家中

6月29日最高法院決策意見(jiàn)書(shū)節(jié)選(內(nèi)容非常精彩, 推薦能讀的朋友仔細(xì)閱讀一下, 200多頁(yè)的意見(jiàn)書(shū), 我沒(méi)法兒去一一翻譯):

"In the?wake of the Civil War, Congress proposed and the States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that no State shall “deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws.” Amdt. 14, §1.?To its proponents, the Equal Protection Clause represented a “foundation[al] principle”—“the absolute equality of all citizens of the United States politically and civilly before their own laws.” Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 431 (1866) (statement of Rep.Bingham) (Cong. Globe). The Constitution, they were determined, “should not permit any distinctions of law basedon race or color,”?Supp. Brief for United States on Reargument in?

Brown?

v.?

Board of Education

, O. T.?1953, No. 1 etc.,?p. 41 (detailing the history of the adoption of?the Equal Protection Clause), because any “l(fā)aw which operates upon one man [should] operate?

equally?

upon all,” Cong. Globe 2459 (statement of Rep. Stevens). As soon-to-be President James Garfield observed, the Fourteenth Amendment would hold “over every American citizen, without regard to color, the protecting shield of law.”?

Id.

, at 2462. And in doing so, said Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan, the Amendment would give “to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or themost haughty.”?

Id.

, at 2766. For “[w]ithout this principleof equal justice,” Howard continued, “there is no republicangovernment and none that is really worth maintaining.”?

Ibid."

"In?

Gayle?

v.?

Browder

, for example, we summarily affirmed a decision invalidating state and local laws that required segregation in busing. 352 U. S. 903 (1956) (

per curiam

). As the lower court explained, “[t]he equal protection clause requires equality of treatment before the law for all persons withoutregard to race or color.”?

Browder?

v.?

Gayle

, 142 F. Supp. 707, 715 (MD Ala. 1956). And in?

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore?

v.?

Dawson

, we summarily affirmed a decision striking down racial segregation at public beaches and bathhouses maintained by the State of Maryland and the city of Baltimore. 350 U. S. 877 (1955) (

per curiam

). “It is obvious that racial segregation in recreational activities can nolonger be sustained,” the lower court observed.?

Dawson?

v.?

Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

, 220 F. 2d 386, 387 (CA4 1955) (

per curiam

). “[T]he ideal of equality before the law which characterizes our institutions” demanded as much.?

Ibid.?

In the decades that followed, this Court continued to vindicate the Constitution’s pledge of racial equality. Laws dividing parks and golf courses; neighborhoods and businesses; buses and trains; schools and juries were undone, all by a transformative promise “stemming from our American ideal of fairness”: “‘the Constitution . . . forbids . . . discrimination by the General Government, or by the States,?against any citizen because of his race.’”?

Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating allof it. And the Equal Protection Clause, we have accordinglyheld, applies “without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality”—it is “universal in [its] application.”?

Yick Wo

, 118 U. S., at 369. For “[t]he guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color.”?

Regents of Univ. of Cal.?

v.?

Bakke

, 438 U. S. 265, 289–290 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). “If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.”?

Id.

, at 290.?

U. S., at 306–307 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet that was “discrimination for its own sake,” which “the Constitution forbids.”?

Id.

, at 307 (citing,?

inter alia

,?

Loving

, 388??U. S., at 11). Justice Powell next observed that the goal of “remedying . . . the effects of ‘societal discrimination’” was also insufficient because it was “an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.”?

Bakke

, 438 U. S., at 307. Finally, Justice Powell found there was “virtually no evidence in the record indicatingthat [the school’s] special admissions program” would, asthe school had argued, increase the number of doctors working in underserved areas.?

Id.

, at 310.?

These limits,?

Grutter?

explained, were intended to guard against two dangers that all race-based government action portends. The first is the risk that the use of race will devolve into “illegitimate . . . stereotyp[ing].”?

Richmond?

v.?

J.?

A. Croson Co.

, 488 U. S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion).Universities were thus not permitted to operate their admissions programs on the “belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.”?

Grutter

, 539 U. S., at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted). The second risk is that race would be used not as a plus, but as a negative—to discriminate?

against?

those racial groups that were not the beneficiaries of the race-based preference. A university’s use of race, accordingly, could not occur in a manner that “unduly harm[ed] nonminority applicants.”?

Id.

, at 341.?

To manage these concerns,?

Grutter?

imposed one finallimit on race-based admissions programs. At some point,the Court held, they must end.?

Id.

, at 342. This requirement was critical, and?

Grutter?

emphasized it repeatedly.?“[A]ll race-conscious admissions programs [must] have a termination point”; they “must have reasonable durational limits”; they “must be limited in time”; they must have“sunset provisions”; they “must have a logical end point”;their “deviation from the norm of equal treatment” must be “a temporary matter.”

Ibid.?

(internal quotation marksomitted). The importance of an end point was not just a matter of repetition. It was the reason the Court was willing to dispense temporarily with the Constitution’s unambiguous guarantee of equal protection. The Court recognized as much: “[e]nshrining a permanent justification for racial preferences,” the Court explained, “would offend this fundamental equal protection principle.”?

Ibid.

; see also?

id.,?

at 342–343 (quoting N. Nathanson & C. Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 Chi. Bar Rec. 282, 293 (May–June 1977), for the proposition that?“[i]t would be a sad day indeed, were America to become a quota-ridden society, with each identifiable minority assigned proportional representation in every desirable walk of life”).?

Second, respondents’ admissions programs fail to articulate a meaningful connection between the means they employ and the goals they pursue. To achieve the educational benefits of diversity, UNC works to avoid the underrepresentation of minority groups, 567 F. Supp. 3d, at 591–592,and n. 7, while Harvard likewise “guard[s] against inadvertent drop-offs in representation” of certain minoritygroups from year to year, Brief for Respondent in No. 20–1199, at 16. To accomplish both of those goals, in turn, theuniversities measure the racial composition of their classesusing the following categories: (1) Asian; (2) Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; (3) Hispanic; (4) White; (5) African-American; and (6) Native American. See,?

e.g.

, 397??F. Supp. 3d, at 137, 178; 3 App. in No. 20–1199, at 1278,1280–1283; 3 App. in No. 21–707, at 1234–1241. It is far from evident, though, how assigning students to these racial categories and making admissions decisions based onthem furthers the educational benefits that the universities claim to pursue.

For starters, the categories are themselves imprecise in many ways. Some of them are plainly overbroad: by grouping together all Asian students, for instance, respondentsare apparently uninterested in whether?

South?

Asian or?

East?

Asian students are adequately represented, so long asthere is enough of one to compensate for a lack of the other. Meanwhile other racial categories, such as “Hispanic,” arearbitrary or undefined. See,?

e.g.

, M. Lopez, J. Krogstad, &?J. Passel, Pew Research Center, Who is Hispanic??(Sept. 15,2022) (referencing the “l(fā)ong history of changing labels [and] shifting categories . . . reflect[ing] evolving cultural normsabout what it means to be Hispanic or Latino in the U. S.today”). And still other categories are underinclusive.When asked at oral argument “how are applicants fromMiddle Eastern countries classified, [such as] Jordan, Iraq,Iran, [and] Egypt,” UNC’s counsel responded, “[I] do not know the answer to that question.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707, p. 107; cf.?

post

, at 6–7 (GORSUCH, J., concurring) (detailing the “incoherent” and “irrational stereotypes” that these racial categories further).

Respondents’ admissions programs are infirm for a second reason as well. We have long held that universities may not operate their admissions programs on the “belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.”?

Grutter

, 539 U. S., at 333 (internal quotation marks omitted). That requirement is found throughout our Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence more generally. See,?

e.g.

,?

Schuette?

v.?

BAMN

, 572 U. S. 291, 308 (2014) (plurality opinion) (“In cautioning against ‘impermissible racial stereotypes,’ this Court has rejected the assumption that ‘members of the same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic status, or the community in which they live—think alike . . . .’” (quoting?

Shaw?

v.?

Reno

, 509 U. S.?630, 647 (1993))).

Yet by accepting race-based admissions programs inwhich some students may obtain preferences on the basis of race alone, respondents’ programs tolerate the very thingthat?

Grutter?

foreswore: stereotyping.?The point of respondents’ admissions programs is that there is an inherent benefit in race?

qua?

race—in race for race’s sake. Respondentsadmit as much. Harvard’s admissions process rests on the pernicious stereotype that “a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.”?

Bakke

, 438 U. S., at 316 (opinion of Powell, J.) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 20–1199, at?92. UNC is much the same. It argues that race in itself “says [something] about who you are.” Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 21–707, at 97; see also?

id.

, at 96 (analogizing being of acertain race to being from a rural area).?

We have time and again forcefully rejected the notionthat government actors may intentionally allocate preference to those “who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin.”?

Shaw

, 509 U. S., at 647. The entire point of the Equal Protection Clause is thattreating someone differently because of their skin color is?

not?

like treating them differently because they are from a city or from a suburb, or because they play the violin poorly or well.?

“One of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans the dignity and worthof a person to be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”?

Rice

, 528 U. S., at 517.?But when a university admits students “on the basis of race, it engages in the offensive and demeaning assumption that [students] of a particular race, because of their race, think alike,”?

Miller?

v.?

Johnson

, 515 U. S. 900, 911–912 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted)—at the very least alike in the sense of being different from nonminority students.?

In?doing so, the university furthers “stereotypes that treat individuals as the product of their race, evaluating theirthoughts and efforts—their very worth as citizens—according to a criterion barred to the Government by history and the Constitution.”?

Id.

, at 912 (internal quotation marks omitted).?Such stereotyping can only “cause[] continued hurt and injury,”?

Edmonson

, 500 U. S., at 631, contrary as it is to the “core purpose” of the Equal Protection Clause,?

Palmore

, 466 U. S., at 432.?

Board of Education

, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), in the infamous case?

Korematsu?

v.?

United States

, 323 U. S. 214, 216 (1944). There, the Court upheld the internment of “all persons of Japanese ancestry in prescribed West Coast . . . areas” during World War II because “the military urgency of the situation demanded” it.?

Id.

, at 217, 223. We have since overruled?

Korematsu

, recognizing that it was “gravely wrong the day it was decided.”?

Trump?

v.?

Hawaii

, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 38).?The Court’s decision in?

Korematsu?

nevertheless “demonstrates vividly thateven the most rigid scrutiny can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimateracial classification” and that “[a]ny retreat from the most searching judicial inquiry can only increase the risk of another such error occurringin the future.”

Adarand Constructors, Inc.?

v.?

Pe?a

, 515 U. S. 200, 236 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).