And the symbolic order, the universe of the Word, logos, can only emerge from the experience of this abyss. As Hegel puts it, this inwardness of the pure self must enter also into existence, become an object, oppose itself to this innerness to be external; return to being. This is language as name-giving power.... Through the name, the object as individual entity is born out of the I. What we must be careful not to miss here is how Hegels break with the Enlightenment tradition can be discerned in the reversal of the very metaphor for the subject: the subject is no longer the Light of Reason opposed to the nontransparent, impenetrable Stuff (of Nature, Tradition . . . ); his very kernel, the gesture that opens up the space for the Light of Logos, is absolute negativity qua night of the world," the point of utter madness in which fantasmatic apparitions of partial objects wander around. Consequently, there is no subjectivity without this gesture of withdrawal, which is why Hegel is fully justified in inverting the standard question of how the fall-regression into madness is possible: the true question is rather how the subject is able to climb out of madness and to reach normalcy." That is to say; the withdrawal into self, the cutting off of the links to the Umwelt, is followed by the construction of a symbolic universe that the subject projects onto reality as a kind of substitute-formation destined to recompense us for the loss of the immediate, presymbolic real. However, as Freud himself asserted apropos of Schreber, is not the manufacturing of a substitute-formation that recompenses the subject for the loss of reality the most succinct definition of paranoiac construction as an attempt to cure the subject of the disintegration of his universe? In short, the ontological necessity of madness" resides in the fact that it is not possible to pass directly from the purely animal soul immersed in its natural life-world to normal subjectivity dwelling in its symbolic universe - the vanishing mediator between the two is the mad" gesture of radical withdrawal from reality that opens up the space for its symbolic (re)constitution. It was already Hegel who emphasized the radical ambiguity of the statement What I think, the product of my thought, is objectively true." This statement is a speculative proposition that renders simultaneously the lowest truth," the erratic attitude of the madman caught in his self-enclosed universe, unable to relate to reality, and the "highest truth", the truth of speculative idealism, the identity of thought and being. If, therefore, in this precise sense, as Lacan put it, normalcy itself is a mode, a subspecies of psychosis, that is, if the difference between "normalcy" and madness is inherent to madness in what does then this difference between the "mad"(paranoiac) construction and the "normal"(social construction of) reality consist? Is "normalcy" ultimately not merely a more "mediated" form of madness? Or, as Schelling put it, is normal Reason not merely "regulated madness"??

符號秩序或者說道與邏各斯的世界，只能從這深淵般的體驗中生成出來。正如黑格爾所說，這個純粹自我的內(nèi)在性“也必須進入實存的范疇，變成一個客體，成為與它自己的內(nèi)在性相對立的外在，或者說也必須重歸于現(xiàn)實。這就是語言——一種命名的力量……通過名稱，客體作為獨立的實體從自我中誕生出來”。在此，我們千萬要注意，不要忽略這一點：黑格爾是如何通過顛倒對主體的譬喻而與啟蒙的傳統(tǒng)相決裂的：主體不再是與不透明的、不可透視的東西（比如自然或習(xí)俗）相對立的理性之光，它最內(nèi)在的內(nèi)核、它開辟出為邏各斯之光所澄明的場域的姿態(tài)，恰恰是作為“世界之夜”的絕對的否定性，恰恰是這樣一個完全瘋狂的時點，在其中，“破碎的客體”如詭譎的幽靈一般四處游蕩。所以，沒有這樣一種回撤的姿態(tài)，就沒有主體性，正因此，黑格爾完全有理由翻轉(zhuǎn)這個尋常的問題：徹底墮入瘋狂是如何可能的？而真正的問題是：主體如何能爬出瘋狂的深淵并抵達“正常狀態(tài)”？這也就是說，撤回到自我或者說與母體聯(lián)系的斷開是首先發(fā)生的，接著才是符號世界的建構(gòu)，主體把這個符號世界投射到現(xiàn)實當(dāng)中，這樣的“現(xiàn)實”注定只是一個替代品，以彌補我們?nèi)笔Я说闹苯有耘c前符號的實在。然而，正如弗洛伊德對施列伯所下的診斷：主體為了彌補其現(xiàn)實的缺失而制造替代品，這不正是對妄想癥——主體為治愈其世界的裂解而付出的努力——的最簡明的定義嗎？簡言之，“瘋狂”在本體論上的必然性基于這一事實，即一邊是全然沉浸在自然的生活世界中的“動物靈魂”，一邊是棲居于符號世界中的“正常的”主體，前者不可能直接地變成后者，那種從現(xiàn)實中激進地回撤從而開辟出符號學(xué)結(jié)構(gòu)（或重構(gòu)）之場域的“瘋狂”姿態(tài)，正是二者之間消逝著的中介。黑格爾早已強調(diào)過以下表述的極端兩岐性：“我所思維的、我思維的產(chǎn)物，對客體而言是真理。”該表述是一個思辨命題（譯者注：在黑格爾那里，“思辨”是矛盾的對立同一），它同時呈現(xiàn)為“最低真理”——陷入到他的自我封閉的世界之中，無法與現(xiàn)實建立聯(lián)系的瘋子的不安定姿態(tài)與“最高真理”，也就是思辨唯心論的真理——思維與存在的同一性。因此，正如拉康指出的，從此種意義上說，如果“正?！弊陨硎蔷癫〉囊粋€亞種，或者說，如果“正?！迸c瘋狂之間的區(qū)別內(nèi)在于瘋狂，那么“瘋狂”（妄想癥）構(gòu)造出的現(xiàn)實與“正常”（社會）構(gòu)造出的現(xiàn)實之間的差別又何在呢？難道說，“常態(tài)”終歸不過是瘋狂的一種較為“中間的”形態(tài)嗎？或者，難道正如謝林所指出的那樣，正常的理性不過是“被規(guī)范了的瘋狂”嗎？

Hegel's notion of the "night of the world" as the feminine kernel of subjectivity is thus profoundly "Schellingian" in that it subverts the simple opposition between the Light of Reason and the impenetrable darkness of matter. Its ultimate consequence is that the emergence of reality, of the universe as such, is grounded in a fundamental and irreducible inversion/perversion of the "proper" relationship between ontological forces- if their relationship were to be "set straight", reality as such would disintegrate. Schelling sticks to this fundamental insight of Weltalter up to his late philosophy of mythology and revelation: the universe as such (the actual world) is the result of an original inversion perversion of divine" potencies": "reality" emerges when the harmonious balance between the three primordial divine potencies(A1, A2, A3) is disturbed that is, when the first potency (A1) which should serve as the passive ground for the other, higher potencies, usurps the leading place and thus changes from a benevolent enabling force effective from the background to an egotist contractive force destructive of every otherness. It is only through this perversion/inversion of potencies that the passage from mere potentiality to actuality can occur - the realm of harmony previous to the perversion of potencies is a realm of pure potentiality that lacks the firmness of actual being. Therein resides the great insight of German Idealism: the real, material world is not merely a (distorted) reflection of suprasensible Ideas in the mode of plotinus's emanation but involves a violent reversal of the proper hierarchical relation between Ideas. Schelling's name for this reversal is the force of egotism of contractive Self-sameness(Ichheit, Selbstheit) that provides the firm ground of reality: this Selfsameness is neither passive matter nor universal notional content, but the active force of absolute contraction to a point of self-relating that can only occur in the sphere of the Spirit - matter cannot absolutely contract itself into itself, since it has its center of gravity outside itself (as is proven by the phenomenon of gravity). In short, Schellings crucial point is that the domain of Ideas becomes actual Spirit only through its egotist" perversion/inversion, in the guise of the absolute contraction into a real Person. One must be careful not to miss the point here: it is not only that what we experience as material reality" is the perversion/inversion of the true ideal order; reality emerges insofar as the true ideal order gets inverted in itself, runs amok - in Schelling's terms, the inertia of external material reality is a proof of the divine madness, of the fact that God himself was "out of his mind." (What Schelling is not ready to accept is the logical consequence of his reasoning: this perversion is unsurpassable, the Spirit in its actuality is irreducibly out of joint, the stain of perversion is the unavoidable price for the Spirit's actualization - the notion of a Reconciliation that would sublate the contractive force of egotism in the ethereal medium of Spirit is purely fantasmatic, even when it puts on the technological dress of Virtual Reality and presents itself as the dream of cutting links with our material body and wandering freely in cyberspace.)

因此，作為主體之女性性內(nèi)核的黑格爾的“世界之夜”概念，從其深層的含義上說，是“謝林式的”，因為它顛覆了理性之光與物質(zhì)的不可透視之黑暗之間的簡單對立。它最終的結(jié)論是：現(xiàn)實和宇宙本身的出現(xiàn)，奠基于本體性力量間的“恰當(dāng)”關(guān)系之基本的、不可再被還原的扭曲與顛倒之上，如果它們的關(guān)系被“擺正”，現(xiàn)實就會崩解。謝林直到其晚期的神話哲學(xué)與天啟哲學(xué)，都一直堅持著《世界時代》的這一基本洞見：宇宙自身（現(xiàn)實世界）是神圣“潛能”之原初扭曲與顛倒的結(jié)果：當(dāng)三種原始的神圣潛能A1、A2、A3（譯者注：即能在sein K?nnende、必在sein Müssende、應(yīng)在sein Sollende）之間的和諧平衡被打破時，即在第一種潛能A1——它本應(yīng)作為另外兩種更高潛能的被動性的根據(jù)——篡奪了主導(dǎo)地位，因而從背景性的、仁慈的、促成性的力量轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)闅缫磺兴叩?、以自我為中心的、收縮性的力量時，“現(xiàn)實”出現(xiàn)了。只有經(jīng)過潛能的扭曲與顛倒，從單純的潛能到現(xiàn)實的過渡才能發(fā)生——潛能扭曲之前的和諧的國度是一個單純潛能的國度，其中缺乏實存的確定性。這就是德國唯心論的偉大洞見：現(xiàn)實的、物質(zhì)的世界不僅如普羅提諾流溢說那般，是對超感性的理念的（扭曲）反映，而且涉及到諸理念間恰當(dāng)?shù)牡燃夑P(guān)系的劇烈顛倒。謝林賦予這一顛倒的名稱是“收縮性的、自我同一的、以自我為中心的力量”，它為現(xiàn)實提供了堅實的根據(jù)：這里的自我同一性既不是消極被動的物質(zhì)，也不是普遍的概念性內(nèi)容，而是完全收縮進一個自我相關(guān)點的積極力量，這只能發(fā)生于精神的領(lǐng)域。物質(zhì)不可能完全收縮進自身，因為它的重心在自身之外（這為重力現(xiàn)象所證明）。簡言之，謝林的核心論點是：理念王國要變成現(xiàn)實的精神，只能通過完全收縮成一個實在的人格（譯者注：指“三位一體”中的位格），即通過其“以自我為中心的”的扭曲與顛倒來實現(xiàn)。千萬不要忽略這一點：不只被我們體驗為“物質(zhì)性現(xiàn)實”的東西，是對真實的理念秩序的扭曲與顛倒，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)真實的理念秩序倒置自身，變得瘋狂，現(xiàn)實才會出現(xiàn)。用謝林的話說，外在的物質(zhì)性現(xiàn)實的“慣性”證明了神圣瘋狂的存在，也證明了上帝自身“在其心靈之外”這一事實。（作者注：謝林不愿意接受他推理的邏輯結(jié)論：這樣的顛倒是不可逾越的，實存著的精神作為“秩序的紊亂”這一點不可再被還原，“顛倒”作為污痕，是精神現(xiàn)實化所必須付出的代價。精神憑借一個空靈飄渺的中介，就可以“揚棄”以自我為中心的收縮性力量——這樣一種“和解”觀，即使披上了虛擬現(xiàn)實的科技外衣，表現(xiàn)為“切斷與物質(zhì)性身體的聯(lián)系從而自由地徜徉于賽博空間”的理想，也不過是個純粹的幻想而已。）

This perversion of the “proper” hierarchical relationship between potencies is the key feature of the German Idealist notion of a philosophical "system". Insofar as this perversion is a free act, the most elementary manifestation of freedom, one can see where the standard reproach (a topos from Kierkegaard to Heidegger), according to which the weak point of Schelling's essay on freedom is that it tries to think together what is incompatible (i.e., freedom and system), falls short. “System," in the precise sense of German Idealism, is a totality that is all-encompassing since it includes/contains its own inversion: in a “system," the relationship between A and B, the “higher" and the “l(fā)ower" principle, is only fully actualized when, within the domain of B, their proper relationship is inverted, that is, A itself is subordinated to B. We can also see in what sense the notion of system is strictly equivalent to the project of conceiving the Absolute “not only as Substance, but also as Subject," as Hegel put it: the principle of subjectivity means that what is originally a subordinate moment of the Absolute can posit itself as its own Center and subordinate to itself its own substantial presuppositions. Or, to put it in more popular terms, the gesture of the subject par excellence is that of wilfully putting at stake the entire substantial content for a capricious meaningless detail: “I want this, even if the whole world goes down." Therein resides what Hegel calls the “infinite right of subjectivity”: the subject’s freedom has to actualize itself against Substance, and it can do so only by way of elevating a contingent, meaningless particular moment that the subject posits as its embodiment, over the entire substantial content.

這種諸潛能間“恰當(dāng)?shù)摹钡燃夑P(guān)系的顛倒，是德國唯心論的哲學(xué)“體系”觀的關(guān)鍵特征。這個顛倒是自由的行動，是自由的最基本的表現(xiàn)，依那種常見的批評（從克爾愷郭爾到海德格爾的傳統(tǒng)論題），謝林論自由的弱點是他力圖將不兼容的東西（自由與體系）放在一起思考，所以他失敗了。在德國唯心論看來，“體系”是一個包羅萬象的總體，因為它包含著自身的顛倒：在一個“體系”中，“高級”原則A與“低級”原則B之間的關(guān)系要完全實現(xiàn)出來，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)在B的領(lǐng)域內(nèi)，二者的恰當(dāng)關(guān)系被顛倒時，也就是說，A反倒隸屬于B時。我們可以看到，這樣的體系觀何等嚴(yán)格地等價于把絕對認(rèn)作“不僅是實體，而且是主體”的設(shè)想，正如黑格爾所說：主體性原則意味著，原本隸屬于絕對的要素，可以把自己設(shè)定成自己的中心，并且使自己的實體性前提隸屬于自己?；蛘哂酶ㄋ椎脑捳f，最卓越的主體性姿態(tài)是這樣的：為了一件變幻無常的、毫無意義的瑣事，固執(zhí)地賭上所有的實體性內(nèi)容，“我就要這個，哪怕世界毀滅”。黑格爾所謂“主體性的無限權(quán)利”就在于此：主體必須反對實體才能實現(xiàn)自己的自由，而且，主體只有把一個偶然的、無意義的特殊要素看作是自己的化身，并把它提升到所有的實體內(nèi)容之上，才能實現(xiàn)自己的自由。

This inclusion of the inversion of the "proper" relationship is not only the key feature of Schelling’s notion of freedom (as the freedom for good and evil, i.e., the freedom to invert the proper relationship), but also Fichte’s and Hegel’s, and even Kant's. Is not the aim of Fichte's "doctrine of science" to explain how the subject at the transcendental level, the pure 1, which “posits" the entire objective content, experiences itself as passively determined by the universe of objectivity; how the proper relationship between Subject and Object is inverted? Is not the whole point of Hegel’s theory of “alienation" to explain how the product of social activity is reified into an autonomous substantial content that subordinates to itself its own generative force? And do we not encounter the same inversion in the fundamental Kantian deadlock that resides in the overlapping of the condition of impossibility (the inaccessibility of the noumenal realm to finite human conscience) with the condition of possibility (humanity can act morally out of Duty only insofar as the noumenal realm is inaccessible to human beings) - humanity's limitation to finitude, that is, the very condition that prevents it from ever being able to fulfil its ethical destination, is at the same time a positive condition of its ethical activity? Subject, freedom, and system are thus three names for the same gesture of inversion.

這種對“恰當(dāng)”關(guān)系的顛倒，不僅是謝林自由觀的關(guān)鍵特征（即善與惡的自由，或者說，顛倒恰當(dāng)關(guān)系的自由），而且是費希特的、黑格爾的，甚至是康德的。費希特“知識學(xué)”的目標(biāo)不是解釋先驗主體——“設(shè)定出”所有客體性內(nèi)容的純粹的“一”——是如何體驗到它自己被動地為客體的世界所決定的嗎，不是解釋主客間的恰當(dāng)關(guān)系是如何被顛倒的嗎？黑格爾“異化”理論的關(guān)鍵，不是解釋社會活動的產(chǎn)物如何物化為一種自主的實體性內(nèi)容，并反過來使生成它自己的力量隸屬于它的嗎？另外，在康德哲學(xué)的基本僵局中，我們不是也遇到了同樣的顛倒嗎？康德的僵局在于不可能性條件（有限的人類良知無法通達本體界）與可能性條件（人類只有在無法通達本體界的條件下，才能夠出于責(zé)任而有道德地行動）的交疊——人類的有限性，即始終阻止人實現(xiàn)其倫理目標(biāo)的條件，同時也是倫理行動的積極條件。因此，主體、自由和體系是同一個顛倒姿態(tài)的不同名稱。

Jean-Pierre Dupuy developed a homologous notion of autonomous system by way of confronting Derridean deconstruction with the "theory of systems": the latter defines an autonomous system by the very feature that deconstruction denounces as the index of the system's failure to achieve autonomy, that is, by the fact that the system contains (in both senses of the term: to encompass and to restrain) its "condition of impossibility", an element that inverts/subverts its fundamental constellation - it was already Hegel who conceived the Absolute as that which, in its relation to its Otherness, relates to itself. . . Dupuy conceives this inherent inversion as the elementary "logical matrix of deconstruction": in the dominant field I, 2 is subordinated to 1, whereas in the subordinated field II, 1 itself is subordinated to 2. In general, Rhetoric is subordinated to Thought (rhetoric should serve as a mere device to express our thought more clearly); however, within the rhetorical domain itself. Thought is subordinated to Rhetoric (rhetorical manipulations sooner or later “contaminate” thought itself and subordinate it to its goal of achieving a persuasive “rhetorical effect") It is easy to discern the same matrix in Hegel’s treatment of the touchy subject of the relationship between Religion and State: Religion (God), of course, stands over the State, but within the domain of the State, State should exert power over Religion; that is. Religion qua social institution should follow the State’s regulations. The insight into the necessity of this inversion is what distinguishes Reason from Understanding: according to the stiff rules of Understanding, if State is subordinated to Religion, this means that theocracy is the only legitimate form of government. The clergy should act directly as politically sovereign; every subordination of Religion to nonreligious State regulations is a depraved compromise (the position of “religious fundamentalism”). Reason, however, tells us that Religion truly rules the world precisely by accepting its own subordinate role within the sphere that is subordinated to itself. A King can legitimately exert unlimited power over all terrestrial institutions, inclusive of the Church, only insofar as this power itself is legitimized as grounded in God. One is tempted to formulate this reversal, which, perhaps, is ideology at its purest, in the well-known Marxist terms of the difference between the dominant agency and the agency that determines “in the last instance’': God determines everything “in the last instance”, yet he exerts this determining role in the very form of the rule of the State over every social institution, inclusive of the Church. Another example is the way Gypsies function in the social perception of Balkan Slavic nations as a carnivalesque inversion of the “normal” patriarchal universe - the topsy-turvy world of disarranged social and sexual hierarchies (men with breasts, women with moustaches, etc.). This inversion is, however, internal to the (patriarchal) Order; it serves as its support: it is only through the supplement of this inversion that the Order is accomplished, fully actualized, that it becomes autonomous. We are dealing here with a mutual enveloping best illustrated by Eschers two hands drawing each other: “Sacred” is the all-encompassing sea from which the domain of the Profane has to separate itself, yet once we are within the Profane, the Sacred itself starts to function as a special domain within the Profane, enclosed by it, that is, as its "super-structure", its inherent “excess." (Far from being a surplus that comes after our profane needs are satisfied, the Sacred is thus at the beginning; that is, the story begins with an excessive expenditure and only then passes to its economization, to rational calculation of needs, or, as Schelling put it, the Beginning is the negation of the process, of what begins with it. For that reason, the enlightened perspective that takes as its starting point the priority of real needs and wonders at superfluous expenditure while so many basic needs remain unsatisfied, is misleading. A brief reminder from the history of early capitalism is very instructive as to this point: automatic machines were first developed as a surplus, as toys intended to amuse the kings gaze (the famous machines in the garden of Versailles); it was only afterward that they were put to real use and applied to increase productivity.)

為了以“系統(tǒng)論”對抗德里達的解構(gòu)論，讓·皮埃爾·迪皮伊提出了與上文相應(yīng)的“自主系統(tǒng)”的概念，它的定義是這樣的：包覆著contain（這個詞有包含與抑制雙重含義）自己的“不可能性條件”的系統(tǒng)，或者說包覆著“一個能夠顛覆系統(tǒng)的基本架構(gòu)的要素”的系統(tǒng)，而這一點正是為解構(gòu)論所貶斥的、系統(tǒng)未能實現(xiàn)自主化的標(biāo)志——這就是黑格爾早已提出的“絕對對他者的關(guān)系就是對自身的關(guān)系”。迪皮伊把這種內(nèi)在的顛倒視為基本的“解構(gòu)的邏輯矩陣”：在支配性的領(lǐng)域I中，2服從于1，而在從屬性的領(lǐng)域II中，1反倒服從于2。總體上看，修辭服從于思想（修辭本應(yīng)僅僅是一種有助于清晰表達思想的手段），然而，在修辭自身的領(lǐng)域中，思想服從于修辭（修辭的運用遲早要“污染”思想本身，并使它服從于“達到有說服力的修辭效果”的目標(biāo)）……在黑格爾對宗教與國家間的關(guān)系這一難題的處理上，我們很容易辯識出相同的矩陣：宗教（上帝）當(dāng)然監(jiān)督著國家，但在國家的領(lǐng)域內(nèi)，國家應(yīng)當(dāng)對宗教行使權(quán)力，作為社會組織的宗教應(yīng)當(dāng)服從國家的法律。能否洞察到這一顛倒的必要性，是理性與知性的區(qū)別：根據(jù)知性呆板的法則，假如國家從屬于宗教，這就意味著神權(quán)政體是唯一一種合法的政體，神職人員應(yīng)當(dāng)直接掌握最高政治權(quán)力，宗教對世俗國家法律的任何一種服從都是墮落的妥協(xié)（即“原教旨主義”的立場）。然而，理性告訴我們，宗教真正統(tǒng)治世界的方法恰恰是承認(rèn)：在從屬于自己的領(lǐng)域內(nèi)，自己反倒處于從屬的地位。國王能合法地對人間的所有機構(gòu)，包括對教會施加無限的權(quán)力，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)這種權(quán)力在上帝那里有合法的根據(jù)。如果有人想確切地表達出這種顛倒的話（或許，這是最純粹的意識形態(tài)），那么，他可以用眾所周知的馬克思主義術(shù)語——占統(tǒng)治地位的因素與“歸根到底”起決定性作用的因素之間的區(qū)別（譯者注：在一個社會結(jié)構(gòu)中，上層建筑占據(jù)著統(tǒng)治地位，經(jīng)濟因素看起來處于上層建筑的支配之下，但是這個社會結(jié)構(gòu)本身是由經(jīng)濟因素（生產(chǎn)方式）塑造的，生產(chǎn)方式“歸根到底”起決定性的作用）——來闡述：一切“最終”都由上帝來決定，上帝卻以國家統(tǒng)治的形式，對包括教會在內(nèi)的一切社會機構(gòu)發(fā)揮他的決定性作用。另一個例子是，吉普賽人在巴爾干斯拉夫國家的社會知覺中發(fā)揮的功能是：他們狂歡般地顛倒了“正常的”父權(quán)制系統(tǒng)，把它弄成了一個社會和性別的等級制通通混亂（男人有乳房，女人留胡子）的亂七八糟的世界。然而，這一顛倒卻內(nèi)在于父權(quán)制秩序，前者充當(dāng)著后者的根據(jù)：只有經(jīng)由這一顛倒的補充，父權(quán)秩序才得以完滿地實現(xiàn)，才得以變得自主化。在此，我們所討論的是一種相互包含的關(guān)系，埃舍爾的畫作《手畫手》是對這種關(guān)系的絕佳圖示：“宗教”是包羅萬象的大海，世俗領(lǐng)域不得不從其中分離出來，然而，一旦我們處于世俗領(lǐng)域之內(nèi)，宗教自身就開始作為一個被世俗包裹在內(nèi)的特殊領(lǐng)域而發(fā)揮作用，或者說，作為世俗的“上層建筑”和內(nèi)在的“剩余”而發(fā)揮作用。（作者注：這種剩余絕非在我們的世俗需求被滿足之后才出現(xiàn)的，相反，宗教一開始就存在。文明開端于過度的消費，然后才過渡到節(jié)約和對需求的理性計算，或者，正如謝林所說，開端是對進程的否定，是對自它而始者的否定。正因此，啟蒙的這一觀點具有欺騙性，它把優(yōu)先滿足真實需求當(dāng)作開端，因此對“在如此多的基本需求尚未被滿足時的過度消費”感到吃驚。簡單回顧一下資本主義的早期歷史能讓我們更好地理解這一點：自動化機械最初是作為一種剩余、一種用來取悅國王的玩具（凡爾賽宮中的那個著名的機械）而發(fā)展起來的，后來它們才被應(yīng)用于實際，以提高生產(chǎn)力。）