American Economic Review?2023年第8期

Vol. 113 No. 8 August 2023

——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

01.Does Identity Affect Labor Supply?

身份認(rèn)同影響勞動(dòng)力供給嗎?

How does identity influence economic behavior in the labor market? I investigate this question in rural India, focusing on the effect of caste identity on job-specific labor supply. In a field experiment, laborers choose whether to take up various job offers, which differ in associations with specific castes. Workers are less willing to accept offers that are linked to castes other than their own, especially when those castes rank lower in the social hierarchy. Workers forgo large payments to avoid job offers that conflict with their caste identity, even when these decisions are made in private.

身份認(rèn)同如何影響勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)中的經(jīng)濟(jì)行為?我在印度農(nóng)村調(diào)查了這個(gè)問(wèn)題，重點(diǎn)關(guān)注種姓身份對(duì)特定工作的勞動(dòng)力供應(yīng)的影響。在一項(xiàng)實(shí)地實(shí)驗(yàn)中，勞動(dòng)者選擇是否接受各種工作機(jī)會(huì)，這些工作機(jī)會(huì)與特定的種姓有關(guān)。工人們不太愿意接受與自己以外的種姓有關(guān)的工作機(jī)會(huì)，尤其是當(dāng)這些種姓在社會(huì)等級(jí)中排名較低的時(shí)候。工人們放棄高薪是為了避免與他們的種姓身份相沖突的工作機(jī)會(huì)，即使這些決定是私下做出的。

02.The Reversal Interest Rate

反轉(zhuǎn)利率

Joseph Abadi

Markus Brunnermeier

Yann Koby

The reversal interest rate is the rate at which accommodative monetary policy reverses and becomes contractionary for lending. We theoretically demonstrate its existence in a macroeconomic model featuring imperfectly competitive banks that face financial frictions. When interest rates are cut too low, further monetary stimulus cuts into banks' profit margins, depressing their net worth and curtailing their credit supply. Similarly, when interest rates are low for too long, the persistent drag on bank profitability eventually outweighs banks' initial capital gains, also stifling credit supply. We quantify the importance of this mechanism within a calibrated New Keynesian model.

逆轉(zhuǎn)利率是指寬松的貨幣政策發(fā)生逆轉(zhuǎn)并導(dǎo)致信貸收縮的利率。我們?cè)谝粋€(gè)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)模型中從理論上證明了它的存在，該模型以面臨金融摩擦的不完全競(jìng)爭(zhēng)銀行為特征。當(dāng)利率降得太低時(shí)，進(jìn)一步的貨幣刺激會(huì)削減銀行的利潤(rùn)率，壓低它們的凈值，減少它們的信貸供應(yīng)。同樣，當(dāng)利率處于低位的時(shí)間過(guò)長(zhǎng)時(shí)，對(duì)銀行盈利能力的持續(xù)拖累最終會(huì)超過(guò)銀行最初的資本收益，這也會(huì)抑制信貸供應(yīng)。我們?cè)谝粋€(gè)校準(zhǔn)的新凱恩斯主義模型中量化了這一機(jī)制的重要性。

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03.?Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness

個(gè)人和組織是國(guó)家效能的源泉

Michael Carlos Best?

Jonas Hjort?

David Szakonyi

Bureaucrats implement policy. How important are they for a state's productivity? And do the trade-offs between policies depend on their effectiveness? Using data on 16 million public purchases in Russia, we show that 39 percent of the variation in prices paid for narrowly defined items is due to the individual bureaucrats and organizations who manage procurement. Low-price buyers also display higher spending quality. Theory suggests that such differences in effectiveness can be pivotal for policy design. To illustrate, we show that a common one—bid preferences for domestic suppliers—substantially improves procurement performance, but only when implemented by ineffective bureaucrats.

官僚們執(zhí)行政策。它們對(duì)一個(gè)州的生產(chǎn)力有多重要?政策之間的權(quán)衡是否取決于它們的有效性?利用俄羅斯1600萬(wàn)筆公共采購(gòu)的數(shù)據(jù)，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在狹義定義的項(xiàng)目上，39%的價(jià)格差異是由管理采購(gòu)的個(gè)別官僚和組織造成的。低價(jià)買家也表現(xiàn)出更高的消費(fèi)品質(zhì)。理論表明，這種有效性差異可能對(duì)政策設(shè)計(jì)至關(guān)重要。為了說(shuō)明這一點(diǎn)，我們展示了對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)供應(yīng)商的單一投標(biāo)偏好，但只有在低效的官僚機(jī)構(gòu)實(shí)施時(shí)，才會(huì)大大提高采購(gòu)績(jī)效。

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04.?The Political Economy of International Regulatory Cooperation

國(guó)際規(guī)制合作的政治經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)

Giovanni Maggi?

Ralph Ossa

We examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend crucially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for product standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if producer lobbies are strong enough, agreements on product standards lead to excessive deregulation and decrease welfare, while agreements on process standards tighten regulations and enhance welfare.

我們研究了在生產(chǎn)商團(tuán)體的游說(shuō)壓力下談判達(dá)成的國(guó)際監(jiān)管協(xié)議。游說(shuō)如何影響監(jiān)管政策的合作制定，以及國(guó)際協(xié)議對(duì)福利的影響，關(guān)鍵取決于不同國(guó)家生產(chǎn)者的利益是一致的還是相互沖突的。產(chǎn)品標(biāo)準(zhǔn)多出現(xiàn)前一種情況，工藝標(biāo)準(zhǔn)多出現(xiàn)后一種情況。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，如果生產(chǎn)者游說(shuō)團(tuán)體足夠強(qiáng)大，產(chǎn)品標(biāo)準(zhǔn)協(xié)議會(huì)導(dǎo)致過(guò)度放松管制并降低福利，而過(guò)程標(biāo)準(zhǔn)協(xié)議會(huì)收緊監(jiān)管并提高福利。

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05.?The Micro Anatomy of Macro Consumption Adjustments

宏觀消費(fèi)調(diào)整的微觀剖析

Rafael Guntin?

Pablo Ottonello?

Diego J. Perez?

We study crises characterized by large adjustments of aggregate consumption through their microlevel patterns. We document the cross-sectional patterns of consumption adjustment across the income distribution and find large adjustments for top-income households, who exhibit consumption-income elasticities similar to or larger than the average. We construct a heterogeneous-agent open economy model of consumption under income fluctuations and show that the data patterns are largely consistent with theories that attribute the dynamics of aggregate consumption to changes in aggregate permanent income. We also discuss our findings' implications for theories based on the tightening of households' borrowing constraints and analyze policy implications.

我們通過(guò)微觀層面的模式研究以總消費(fèi)大幅調(diào)整為特征的危機(jī)。我們記錄了收入分配中消費(fèi)調(diào)整的橫截面模式，并發(fā)現(xiàn)高收入家庭的調(diào)整幅度很大，這些家庭表現(xiàn)出與平均水平相似或大于平均水平的消費(fèi)收入彈性。我們構(gòu)建了收入波動(dòng)下的消費(fèi)異質(zhì)性主體開(kāi)放經(jīng)濟(jì)模型，并表明數(shù)據(jù)模式與將總消費(fèi)動(dòng)態(tài)歸因于總永久收入變化的理論基本一致。我們還討論了我們的研究結(jié)果對(duì)基于家庭借貸約束收緊的理論的影響，并分析了政策影響。

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06.?The Missing Intercept: A Demand Equivalence Approach

缺失的攔截:需求等價(jià)方法

I give conditions under which changes in private spending are accommodated in general equilibrium exactly like changes in aggregate fiscal expenditure. Under such demand equivalence, researchers can use time series evidence on fiscal multipliers to recover the general equilibrium "missing intercept" of shocks to private spending identified in the cross section. Through the lens of this theory, time series estimates of a fiscal multiplier around one suggest a missing intercept close to zero—an observation that I illustrate with an application to the 2008 tax rebates. I also discuss the robustness of this aggregation approach to plausible violations of demand equivalence.

我給出了一些條件，在這些條件下，私人支出的變化完全像財(cái)政總支出的變化一樣被納入一般均衡。在這種需求等價(jià)下，研究人員可以利用財(cái)政乘數(shù)的時(shí)間序列證據(jù)來(lái)恢復(fù)橫截面中確定的私人支出沖擊的一般均衡“缺失截距”。從這一理論的角度來(lái)看，財(cái)政乘數(shù)在1左右的時(shí)間序列估計(jì)表明，缺失的截距接近于零——我用2008年退稅的應(yīng)用來(lái)說(shuō)明這一觀察結(jié)果。我還討論了這種聚合方法對(duì)合理的需求等效違反的魯棒性。

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07.?Who Benefits from State Corporate Tax Cuts? A Local Labor Markets Approach with Heterogeneous Firms: Comment

誰(shuí)受益于國(guó)家公司稅減免?異質(zhì)企業(yè)的本地勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)研究:評(píng)論

Clément Malgouyres?

Thierry Mayer?

Clément Mazet-Sonilhac

Suarez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax incidence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common determinants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional margin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, impeding the identification of incidence from the four estimated reduced-form effects. Assigning consensual values to the unidentified parameters, we find that the incidence share borne by firm owners is closer to 25 percent than 40 percent.

Suarez Serrato和Zidar(2016)在不完全移動(dòng)企業(yè)的空間均衡模型中確定了國(guó)家公司稅的發(fā)生率。他們的鑒別論點(diǎn)建立在比較靜態(tài)的基礎(chǔ)上，忽略了他們的模型所隱含的一個(gè)渠道:地點(diǎn)吸引力的共同決定因素與選擇該地點(diǎn)的公司的平均特殊生產(chǎn)率之間的聯(lián)系。這種構(gòu)成邊際導(dǎo)致勞動(dòng)需求彈性獨(dú)立于產(chǎn)品需求彈性，從而阻礙了從四種估計(jì)的約化效應(yīng)中識(shí)別發(fā)生率。通過(guò)對(duì)未確定參數(shù)賦值，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)企業(yè)所有者承擔(dān)的發(fā)生率份額更接近25%，而不是40%。

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